SPAIN AND KOSOVA: what is there to be afraid of?

This text corresponds to the translation of a post written in Portuguese where I analyzed the outcome of the parliamentary elections held in Spain last March.

I have decided to post it now, because some signs are starting to appear that Madrid may soon recognize Kosova as an Independent state, a move that I am sure will be followed by the Portuguese government

(much to my dismay, Portugal lost another excellent opportunity to affirm its commitment to the democratic value of self determination that its people so well defended in 1999 regarding the people of East-Timor … as Kosova strives to be independent, the government of the oldest independent country in Europe, that is, Portugal, is spitting of the graves of the nation forefathers and letting our foreign policy be submitted to the narrow interests of the spanish government… what would Luísa de Gusmão, who by the way was spanish, say about this? When in 1640 husband the Duc of Bragança told her he had decided to accept to lead a plot to restaure the independence lost in 1580, she supported him by saying ‘I will rather be a Queen for one day than a Duchess for the rest of my life’)

So, here’s the translation (with some minor changes):

The electoral results in Spain fully contradict the pseudo-theory of the domino effect.

Among the prophets of doom, there were many people that were predicting a terrible threat to the territorial integrity of the spanish state, because of the fact that Kosovo had dared to declare the Independence, which a number of states has already or intends to recognize.

Such delirious minds imagined hordes of Basque, Catalan or even Galician nationalists reacting in a pavlovian way to the bell ring of independence …

But, what do the results of the last parliamentary election held in Spain last March tell us?
In order to anwser that, I’ll set aside the global results, less relevant results for this question, and analyze the partial results in the regions most connoted with nationalists aspirations, the Basque Country and Catalonia:

The Basque country:

Turnout in 2008: 64.9 % of the registred voters.
In 2004:75.9 %

The PSOE won, with 425.567 votes, corresponding to 38,09 %.
In 2004, it had had 336.958 votes, corresponding to 27.23 %.
This means that the Socialist Party of the Spanish Workers, headed by José Luiz Zapatero, had an increase both in percentage and in the number of voters.

The second most voted party was the nationalist party EAJ-PNV, with 303.246 votes (27,14 %). This party had a decrease both in percentage and in the number of voters. In 2004 it had had 417.154 votes (33,71 %). It is important to say that, despite being a nationalist party, the EAJ-PNV rejects the use of violence it condemns and opposes ETA.
If we add the results of the PSOE with those of the right-wing Popular Party (PP)(18.5 %), we will come to the conclusion that 56.59 % of the voters opted for parties that do not defend Basque nationalism.

Catalonia:

Turnout in 2008: 71.19 % of the registred voters.
In 2004: 76.96 %

The PSOE won, with 1 672 777 votes, corresponding to 45.33 %.
In 2004, it had had 1 577 330 votes, corresponding to 39.5 %.
That means it increased both in percentage and in number of votes.

The second most voted party was the nationalist party CIU, with 774 317 votes (20.98 %). This party lost in number of votes, though it has slightly higher percentage. In 2004 it had had 829 042 votes (20.76 %). This is due to the fact that the turnout was lower in these elections.

If we add the PSOE results of the with those of PP (16.39 %), we will come to the conclusion that 61.72 % of those who voted opted for parties that do not defend Catalan nationalism.

As Spain made its transition from the Franco fascist regime to democracy, Madrid has managed to reject the oppressive policies of national homogenization that had been embraced since the Catholic Kings Isabel of Castilla and Fernando of Aragon expelled the Moors from Granada in 1492.

Spain is now a state with a high level of decentralization, which offers substantial autonomy to its regions in political, economical and cultural terms. Being a multinational state, it is constituted by nations with deep cultural ties between them, whose peoples share a specifically Spanish identity. Here I have no doubt to include the Basque nation, that, despite having a bigger diversity, particularly because of the fact that it has a national language of origin non-latin origin, gives an essential contribution to the imagined community that binds together the Spanish people.

Even though it might be tempting to the Basque, Catalan or Galician nationalists to use the case of Kosovo as a precedent for their regions’ independence, the comparison is deeply flawed. However, if one day the citizens of the Basque Country or of Catalonia decide to held a referendum, that’s their right to self-determination. In Canada two referenda about the independence of the Quebec have already been organized, and its citizens chose to be canadians.

I am sure of what to look at other regions, like Scotland, Corsica, etc., we will come to similar conclusions.

I once again would like to remind why I saw the Declaration of Independence of Kosova as a something it was worth supporting. Legitimacy is much more important than sovereignty. Sovereignty does not give to any government the right to disrespect the basic human rights of a part of the population of his territory. I remember that most democratic constitutions proclaim that sovereignty belongs to the people. Therefore, if the people decide that they are being ruled by an oppressive power, it is their right to refuse such rule.

All data was collected at the website of the spanish newspaper El País.

Aditional readings:

Reconnoscamo Kosovo, an article by José Ignacio Torreblanca, published in El País in April 22, 2008Paí

It was then translated into english and published at New Kosova Report:

Spain should recognize Kosovo

An excerpt:

(…) In retrospect, it is understandable that the outcome of independence was not as Spain and many other states rightly preferred with an agreement between the parties, as part of a great European and international consensus, but a unilateral declaration instead. But the fact is that today there is a new reality, as undeniable and as irreversible, whose recognition would have to arrive at some point. Kosovo is currently a state protected by the European Union under the Ahtisaari Plan, a plan sponsored by the United Nations, which Spain has supported and should continue to support because it constitutes the best guarantee for the developing of a viable, democratic and respectful state providing the rights of individuals and minorities.

(…)The recognition would help the new state consolidate. Foreign investment will not come if there is no full guarantee of stability and irreversibility. The Kosovar democratic institutions will not be able to progress, neither will the people have any economic incentive to contribute in the construction of a viable state. Therefore, without a firm and resolute support of the EU and the international community, the Kosovars, whether Serbs or Albanians will lose their hope of a better future.

At the same time, a decision in this regard would send an important message to the Serbian nationalists, and those who encourage them from Russia, demonstrating that the EU is not an actor paralyzed by its divisions. Today, the lack of recognition sends a wrong message to the Serbian authorities, making them believe that independence is reversible or, alternatively, that the EU is going to tolerate Belgrade to annex the region north of the Iber River, where 40% of the Serbian minority is concentrated.

Kosovo: The ultimate myth, by Dubravka Stojanovic (a professional historian from Belgrade), published in the website of the Bosnian Institute.

An excerpt:

(…) During the parliamentary session at which the Resolution on Kosovo was adopted, no one (except the deputies of the coalition around the Liberal-Democrats) spoke about the concrete political questions that would be posed if by some miracle Kosovo were to remain in Serbia. No one spoke, for example, about how the Serbian army and police would enter Kosovo, given that only the presence of such instruments of force testifies to real national sovereignty. No one spoke about how Kosovo citizens would vote in Serbian parliamentary elections, or how the Serbian elite would deal with Albanian deputies in parliament and Albanian ministers in Serbian governments. What sort of educational system would there be? How would the Battle of Kosovo and the Balkan Wars be taught? Would it be in the spirit of ‘the only truth’, ‘our truth’, as our current educational authorities like to say? During all these years, ever since Kosovo was separated from Serbia, I have heard no explication of such questions, because no one ever mentions Kosovo’s population. What is talked about in such conversations is only ‘Kosovo’ – a Kosovo that does not exist in reality, a Kosovo without the people.